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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ST. GEORGE THRIFT AND LOAN, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ] 
RAYMOND L. LOWE, ) 
Defendant, ] 
RAYMOND L. LOWE, ] 
Third-Party Plaintiff, ] 
and Appellee, 
vs. 
GREGORY A. KNOX, 
Third-Party Defendant, 
and Appellant. ] 
> Case No. 920852CA 
1 Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the above-entitled Court by 
provision of Section 78-2a-3(2)(k), U.C.A., 1953 as amended. 
NATURE OF CASE 
Appellee initiated this action as a third-party complaint against Appellant 
seeking recovery of a deficiency remaining following the nonjudicial foreclosure of a trust 
1 
deed. The Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Washington County, State of Utah, the 
honorable James L. Shumate presiding, granted Appellee summary judgment and Appellant 
brings this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Has Appellant alleged a meritorious claim of innocent misrepresentation? 
2. Did Appellant raise any genuine issue of material fact in resisting 
Appellant's motion for summary judgment? 
3. Is Appellant's claim for innocent misrepresentation barred by operation of 
U.C.A. §78-12-26(3). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In determining whether the trial court correctly found that there were no 
genuine issues of material fact, the appellate court views the facts and all reasonable 
inferences in a light most favorable to the party opposing a motion for summary judgment. 
It reviews the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness without any deference to the 
trial court. Neiderhauser Builders v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of all relevant materials is quoted in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For the sake of clarity, the Third-Party Plaintiff and Appellee will be referred 
to as "Lowe" and the Third-Party Defendant and Appellant will be referred to as "Knox". 
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On April 2, 1986, Lowe as seller and Knox as purchaser entered into a 
contract for the purchase of a certain residence located in St. George. The agreed purchase 
price was $69,900. (R 23-24, 55-56, 75-81) In connection therewith, Knox executed a trust 
deed note in the amount of $68,900. (R 24, 55-56, 75-81) The trust deed note was thereafter 
assigned to St. George Thrift and Loan for the purpose of securing an obligation which 
Lowe owed that institution. (R 24, 55-58, 75-81) 
Immediately after his purchase, Knox hired an independent appraiser by the 
name of C. G. Miller who opined that the subject property would be worth $69,500 upon 
the completion of certain improvements costing between $3,000 and $5,000. Miller provided 
his opinion by way of a letter to Knox dated May 1, 1986. (R 215-218, 220, 252). Miller's 
letter included the following statement: "A fully documented report will not be presented 
at this time, but is available upon request. This report would include comparables, a site 
plan, dimensions, etc." (R 252) 
After receiving Miller's report, Knox concluded that, given the terms which 
Lowe had afforded him in the purchase of the property, he had purchased the property at 
a fair price. (R 213, 217, 234-235) 
Thereafter, Knox defaulted in the payment of the subject obligation and St. 
George Thrift and Loan, through regular non-judicial proceedings, foreclosed the subject 
trust deed at a sale which was conducted on October 8, 1991. (R 24-26, 55-58, 75-81) The 
foreclosure resulted in a $25,987 deficiency, the rights to which St. George Thrift and Loan 
later assigned to Lowe. (R 25-26, 55-58, 75-81) Lowe then initiated this action against Knox 
to recover the deficiency. (R 24-26) 
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Knox filed his answer and counterclaim on March 2, 1992. (R 55-58) Knox' 
only defense was based upon his allegation that Lowe had defrauded him in the purchase 
of the residence. Knox alleged that he had agreed to pay $17,900 more for the subject 
residence than it was worth because Lowe had refused to allow Knox the opportunity of 
having the property appraised prior to closing. (R 55-58, 75-81) 
Knox contends that in the Spring of 1991, he became aware of information 
suggesting that the subject property had been worth only approximately $52,000 on the date 
he purchased the property from Lowe. (R 55, 76, 78, 153, 223-226) 
In his deposition, Knox conceded that in negotiating the sale of the property, 
Lowe had never made any statement about the appraised value of the property but had 
merely advised Knox of Lowe's asking price. (R 206-207) Knox contended that in offering 
the property for sale at the stated price, Lowe impliedlv represented that price to be the fair 
market value of the property. 
Upon Lowe's motion for summary judgment the district court concluded that 
the statute of limitations commenced to run against Knox' claim of misrepresentation when 
Knox received Miller's letter of opinion and that Knox' claim has therefore barred by 
operation of U.C.A. §78-12-26(3). (R 162-169) Accordingly, the district court entered 
judgment in favor of Lowe and dismissed Knox' counterclaim. (R 171-173) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
While Knox attempts to allege a claim of innocent misrepresentation, he fails 
to make any showing that Lowe in fact made any representation. Furthermore, to the extent 
that any statement by Lowe could be construed as a representation, such representation is 
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nothing more than an opinion regarding the value of the subject property and not actionable. 
In resisting Lowe's motion for summary judgment, Knox failed to present any 
evidence regarding the fair market value of the subject residence on the date of the sale. 
Accordingly, the district court could have reached the same result on procedural grounds. 
Finally, Knox' claim for innocent misrepresentation is barred by operation of 
the statute of limitations. The three-year period under U.C.A. §78-12-26(3) began to run 
in May 1986 when Knox' agent concluded his investigation and provided Knox with his 
opinion regarding the value of the property. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
KNOX' CLAIM OF INNOCENT MISREPRESENTATION MUST 
FAIL ON THE MERITS. 
This Court may affirm if the district court's decision can be sustained on any 
proper legal basis. See Weber v. Snyderville West, 800 P.2d 316 (Utah App 1990), cert. 
denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). 
The district court could have reached the same result applying any one of 
several legal theories. Accordingly, this Court may consider the other arguments which 
Lowe advanced in connection with his motion for summary judgment. 
The Elements of Misrepresentation 
The elements of a fraudulent misrepresentation claim are: 
(1) That a representation was made; (2) concerning a presently existing 
material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or 
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(b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such 
representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the 
other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) 
and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage. See Pace v. Parish. 122 Utah 
141, 247 P.2d 273, 274-275 (1952). 
In his brief Knox refers to his theory of the case as "fraud in the form of 
innocent misrepresentation. . . ." (Appellant's Brief at 3) Indeed, Knox apparently now 
concedes that he is not pursuing his claim on any level other than innocent 
misrepresentation. (R 209) 
Counsel is not aware of any Utah case granting relief upon this theory. 
Nevertheless, there is authority indicating that such a theory may provide relief in an 
appropriate case. See Restatement, Second, Torts §552C. Under the rule as set out in the 
Restatement, the elements of a claim of innocent misrepresentation are comparable to the 
elements of a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation with the notable absence of the element 
of scienter/recklessness. See generally. Restatement, Second, Torts §552C, comment a.1 
Under any theory of misrepresentation there must be a representation. The 
record fails to disclose that Lowe made any representation regarding the value of the subject 
property. He merely stated his asking price. (R 206-207) 
The Restatement rule relating to innocent misrepresentation is a rule of strict liability and has been 
"confined to sale, rental, or exchange transactions between the plaintiff and the defendant." Restatement, 
Second, Torts §552C comment c. It is comparable to the doctrine of mutual mistake which provides relief 
under principles of contract law. 
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Representations Regarding Value 
Evei statement : i representation, as a general rule, 
representations regarding value are not actionable but are regarded as mere expressions of 
opinion or "trader's talk11 involving matter of judgment and estimation as to which men may 
differ. Wright v. Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1990). The value of property 
is subjective. It is a matter of opinion. Id. at 513, fti.3. 
In Wright, this ^ vd : 
We conclude our discussion of the fraud issue with the observation that 
while the 
law provides reasonable protection to purchasers against 
fraud and deceit[,] . . . it does not go to the romantic 
length of offering indemnity against the adverse 
consequences of folly and indolence or a careless 
indifference to information which would enlighten the 
purchaser as to the truth or falsity of the seller's 
assertions as to value 
[Citation omitted.] The record does not disclose any reason, other 
than his own blind reliance upon Wright's representations, why 
Humphries chose to formalize the transaction prior - at least as he 
recalled — to even viewing the property, much less making independent 
inquiry or obtaining his own appraisal. "It is reasonable to expect that 
. . . vendors would attach the highest possible value to the property. 
Indeed, it would be unreasonable to assume otherwise, and purchasers 
who rely on such representations proceed at their own risk." [Citation 
omitted.] [Emphasis added.] 
Id. at 514. 
Reasonable Reliance upon Opinion of Adverse Party 
Knox contends that Lowe was in possession of "special knowledge" regarding 
the property. This was allegedly information relating to the status of financing for a roadway 
which would provide 
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perpetually enjoyed from the property. 
Lowe shared this information with Knox during contract negotiations. (R 207-
208) While the new roadway was eventually constructed, the improvement was completed 
about two years later than the parties anticipated at the time of entering into the contract.2 
(R 207-213, 218-220, 234-235) 
Knox apparently alleges that "Lowe claimed special knowledge about the 
property11 in order to suggest that he was justified in relying upon Lowe's "opinion" regarding 
value. See Restatement, Second, Torts §542. Such an argument must fail for two reasons: 
Lowe's establishment of an asking price did not constitute an opinion and knowledge which 
is in the possession of both parties is not "special". 
Reliance upon the opinion of an adverse party is reasonable only when the 
party offering it suggests that as a result of his expertise he is in a superior position to 
formulate an opinion. In such a case the person offering the opinion suggests that the other 
party should rely on his judgment because he enjoys a vantage from which the other party 
cannot view the matter. See, Restatement, Second, §Torts §542, comments d and f. 
In the instant case we are talking about mere information — information which 
Lowe shared with Knox - information which was available to Knox in making his own 
judgment. Nothing here relieved Knox of the duty to make reasonable inquiry. He relied 
When it became apparent that the construction of the road would be delayed, Knox approached Lowe 
and obtained a concession from Lowe who extended the trust deed note for a period of two years. (R 211-213, 
219-220, 234-235) His deposition makes it clear that he has waived any claim which he could have asserted 
by reason of any misrepresentation in connection with the timetable for the construction of the roadway and/or 
the view from the property. (R 209-213, 218-220) Knox enjoyed the full benefit of that compromise by 
obtaining an additional two years within which to discharge the subject obligation. Furthermore, Knox 
concedes that he makes no claim against Lowe based upon these items. (R 209-212, 220) 
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on his own judgment. 
Ck\i >v>i v*;- misrepresentation: 
fraudulent , negligent, or innocent. 
POIN r* 
KNOX FAILED TO RESIST LOWE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT WITH EVIDENCE SUPPORTING HIS 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE. 
On a procedural level, the district court could have reached the same result 
because KJIUX failed 1 : resist Lowe: s motion for summary judgment ,„;„ any evidence 
indicating that at the time of the subject sale the property was worth less than he contracted 
to pay,3 
L o w e m a d e out every e lement of his d a r - ' allegations ::: f h is complaint 
which were no t controver ted in Knox' answer. In OKUM to resist the motion for summary 
judgment , Knox n e e d e d to pro\ ideevi-ii : ^  • i i-i^  : ifnt * »t ix ii'tVpv n.; »; •. .. r ,'* 
do. H e merely r ehed on his verified amended answer and counterclaim wherein he made 
finind/ithinlrss i illegal Minis ifgariliiiy III ilini ill lln pinpei l > ini tin hit" nil Mile. 
In Thornock v. Cook. 604 P.2d 934 ( U t a h 1979), t he defendant defended on 
fiii" h;iM'i lli.li lit"! si}»iii«iniiij I ill iln " 'iiiiiiiii i i titvtii was obta ined under duress. 'In affirming a 
summary j u d g m e n t in favor of the plaintiff, the U t a h Sup reme Cour t no ted : "The defendant 
euuttot i d y iijuiii 41M " w r e allegations m v/^uia^ ,,i i.^i pleadings to avoid a summary 
judgmen t bu t mus t set forth specific facts showing that the re is a genuine issue for trial, Rule 
Knox claims that Lowe never denied Knox' allegation thai the subject property was worth only $52,000 
when Knox purchased it. See Appellant's Brief at 10-11. Page 76 and pages 93-94 of the record clearly 
indicate that he is in error. 
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56(a), U.R.C.P." 14 at 936. See also Franklin Financial v. New Empire Develop. Co., 659 
P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983) ("the opponent of a motion, once a prima facie case for summary 
judgment has been made, must file responsive affidavits raising factual issues, or risk the trial 
court's conclusion that there are no factual issues"). 
The district court could have reached the same result based on Knox' failure 
to resist the motion for summary judgment with evidence supporting his claim of 
misrepresentation. 
POINT III 
KNOX' CLAIM OF MISREPRESENTATION IS BARRED BY 
OPERATION OF U.C.A. §78-12-26(3). 
Knox contends that there is a question of fact regarding whether or not the 
receipt of Miller's letter of opinion should have put him upon further inquiry. Indeed, the 
district court's legal conclusion suggests that Knox' failure to make further inquiry was the 
basis of the court's conclusion that the statute of limitations had run. 
Section 78-12-26(3), U.C.A. 1953, provides that an action for fraud or mistake 
must be commenced within three years "except that the cause of action in such a case does 
not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or 
mistake." 
In McConkie v. Hartman. 529 P.2d 801 (Utah 1974), the Utah Supreme Court 
held that the statute of limitations begins to run when the aggrieved party has "full 
opportunity1' to discover the alleged fraud or mistake and fails to make "reasonable inquiry". 
In Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of CaL 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah App. 1987), this 
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Court held that the statute of limitations may begin to run even where the complaining party 
does not have actual notic. . : me alleged iiuutl Id. M 1 IK'i "When: llie aggrieved party 
has possession of 01 access to the facts giving rise to the claim of fraudulent 
misrepresentation, the statute begins to run. 
After purchasing the subject residence, Knox retained a third party whose sole 
charge was to provide Knox with an opinion regarding the fair market value of the subject 
propei ty The • scop 2 ::: f Miller's assignn 11 ' . n *> M 11 »» l ' those factors 
which may have had an impact upon the value of the property. 
Since 1 ' ah le is si lbjective and a matter of opinion Knox 1 etained someone \i ho, 
as the result of his training and experience, should have been in a better position to judge 
L i n e v a 11 u * i » l L I n " [ ) 1C) ( n " 1  i ) ' 1 i mi 1111 mi mi "i v 11 1 1, • 111111 1 I \ 111 J \ u 1 I 1 J \\\ . I 1" 11 u i 11 y t » h 1 a 1111 e 1 i 11 In i ( ) 111 in 1111 111 
an independent party, Knox elected to rely upon that opinion and dealt with the property 
accordingly. Indeed, instead of seeking to avoid the transaction, Knox negotiated a two-year 
extension of the trust deed note. (R 219-220) He negotiated the sale of time-share interests 
in the subject property at a substantial profit, ultimately sold the property to a third party 
and then repurchased it from that third party. (R 238-243) 
In May 1986, Knox personally and/or through his agent had unobstructed 
access to all of the information upon which his frai id claim is predicated Miller synthesized 
this information into an opinion with which KJIOX was comfortable. Knox now claims that 
facts, but because he became aware that someone else apparently held a differing opinion 
regard 1 ui: ;i •..-•• property. 
To allow Knox to assert a claim of misrepresentation almost six years after his 
own agent had concluded his investigation of the property's value would result in the 
recognition of an exception which would swallow the rule. Indeed, under an exception of 
such breadth, if Knox were ever able to locate someone who possessed a differing opinion 
regarding the value of the property on the date of the sale, Knox could claim that he had 
just then discovered the "true value" of the property and that the statute of limitations had 
just begun to run. 
Having chosen an independent appraiser to provide him with an opinion, Knox 
should be charged with the knowledge of all facts which a reasonable investigation of the 
value would have disclosed at the time Knox' agent made his investigation. 
Knox' claim of misrepresentation is barred. 
As a general rule, any claim which would be barred by limitations if separately 
asserted is not available as a setoff or counterclaim. See Annot., 1 A.L.R. 2d 630, 634-641. 
Compare Lindsay v. Woodward, 5 Utah 2d 183, 299 P.2d 619 (1956), (in suit to recover 
compensation for professional services rendered, defendant's counterclaim of medical 
malpractice "containing allegations relative to fraud and breach of contract" held barred). 
Knox has not contended, either in the district court or on appeal, that his claim 
of misrepresentation, even if barred, may be asserted defensively by way of recoupment or 
setoff. Nevertheless, counsel is obliged to advise the court of a line of authority in other 
jurisdictions suggesting that a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, although barred by the 
statute of limitations, may be asserted defensively in an action to recover the purchase price 
of property where the sale was induced by actual fraud. See Annot. 1 A.L.R.2d 630, 680-
12 
684. 
assertion of a claim of innocent misrepresentation or mutual mistake where such claim is 
barred by the statute of limitations. 
CONCLUSION 
Bast uoiHi. '^ ;%' n •' .-.-.. 
order and judgment should be affirmed and the matter should be remanded to the district 
court instructi...... , jtermine and assess against Kno: i: si ich costs and attoi ney's fees 
as Lowe has reasonably incurred on appeal 
RESPEC I FIJI I ,Y SUBMITTED this _____ day of March, 1993. 
/6/ 
Gary W. Pendleton 
Attorney for Appellee 
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Gary W. Pendleton 
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